Unrest in Pakistan

Pervez Musharraf fired the Chief Justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court on March 9th, a move which stirred up a torrent of discontent among lawyers and citizens across the country, sparking street protests and demonstrations. This discontent came to a head in protests yesterday, erupting in violence when supporters of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry gathered in Karachi to hear him deliver a speech:

Twenty-seven people were killed and 100 wounded in Karachi on Saturday in clashes between pro-government and opposition activists as Pakistan's suspended top judge tried to hold a rally with his supporters.

Reports indicate that Chaudhry abandoned the address and left Karachi for Islamabad.

So that's yesterdays news from Pakistan, noteworthy here because of the prominent roles that country, and Pervez Musharraf, have assumed in America's ill-named War on Terror. Unrest, demonstrations, and political violence on such a non-trivial scale merit mention and bring to mind the old 'propping up strongmen' vs. 'promoting liberty' debate, while giving it a more concrete and immediate edge.

The backdrop for these demonstrations (and the forceful response) is the upcoming elections in Pakistan. With only a superficial grasp of the dynamics in play, here's my understanding of the situation... eight years after assuming power by coup, and three years after receiving a vote of confidence by the country's electoral college, Musharaff still wears the General's uniform and faces a related Constitutional hurdle in his bid to become President in this year's national election, the first real test to his incumbency.

Among the most-discussed options for Musharaff to stay in power appear to be 1) striking a deal with Benazir Bhuto wherein Musharaff shares political leadership and retains control of the military, 2) retiring the uniform and running as a civilian within the Constitutional framework, or 3) maintaining power through more autocratic measures such as neutering the judiciary and/or Constitution.

Unfortunately, yesterday's clashes play into fears that Musharraf is leaning towards door number three and, as Cernig notes, advance perceptions "that he is trying to engineer by proxy a situation where a state of emergency is eventually needed - which would allow him to suspend planned elections and stay on as Army head as well as president."

While I do not expect very detailed coverage of this from American media outlets, it is nonetheless an important issue from a strategic perspective. Ferment in Pakistan should be viewed warily. Its membership in the nuclear club, and the threat of instability there, are a potentially explosive combination (excuse the pun) and I am never reassured in knowing that the Bush administration is operating somewhere behind the scenes of any crisis.

That said, the unrest seems to be spurred by the professional classes and not the religious factions, which offers some slight consolation, but brings more starkly into relief the notion that "our son of a bitch" in Pakistan may not be the Shining Knight of Democracy our PR people need to win hearts and minds there, or elsewhere.

*Here's a related video segment from last week, before the crackdown, where Fareed Zakaria and scholar Khaled Ahmed discussed the decision by Musharraf to fire the judge, and what it means in Pakistan.

Comments

[omar]

Musharraf and his goons, spreading democracy and freedom in the great traditions of the pentagon and its "little brown friends"...