Bush arms Sunni insurgents in Iraq

American commanders in Iraq now admit that they are funding and arming Sunni insurgents to help fight Al Qaeda in Iraq.  This strategy is most notable in Al Anbar Province:

American officers who have engaged in what they call outreach to the Sunni groups say many of them have had past links to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia but grew disillusioned with the Islamic militants’ extremist tactics,particularly suicide bombings that have killed thousands of Iraqicivilians. In exchange for American backing, these officials say, theSunni groups have agreed to fight Al Qaeda and halt attacks on Americanunits. Commanders who have undertaken these negotiations say that insome cases, Sunni groups have agreed to alert American troops to thelocation of roadside bombs and other lethal booby traps.

Butcritics of the strategy, including some American officers, say it couldamount to the Americans’ arming both sides in a future civil war.

When have we seen this kind of strategy before?  A few instances come to mind:

• Rome arming Germanic tribes to fight other Germanic tribes.
• United States arming the Mujahideen in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.
• United States arming Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iran war.

The motto "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" represents short-term reasoning.  The circumstances are such that an alliance makes sense at this very moment.  But what happens when the circumstances change?  What happens when the very Sunnis that we are now arming decide to fight the very Shiites, such as Nouri al-Maliki, that we installed into power?

Or even more fundamentally, if the rationale for us remaining in Iraq is based on our long-term good, then why are we implementing a short-term strategy that will end up being a net-negative in the long-run?  That is a paradox if I have ever seen one.